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AND THE COMMON LAW
By J.M. EvANs*
This article examines the application of the principles of fundamental
justice in section 7 of the Charter to administrative law, and in particular
its relationship to non-constitutional grounds of judicial review. The
author argues that in this area of the law the common law should
generally be regarded as the source of the basic tenets of our legal system
that section 7 has been said to embody. The author suggests that the
traditional grounds of judicial review of administrative action represent
the courts' accommodation of individual rights and the collective interest,
and thus cover much the same ground as the Charter. However, the
article also identifies some extensions of the courts' supervisory role over
administrative agencies that are attributable to the constitutionally
entrenched status of the principles of fundamental justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the adoption of the Canadian Char-ter of Rights
and Freedoms,1 public lawyers in Canada understood that there can
be a close relationship between the constitution and the common
Copyright, 1991, J.M. Evans.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York UniVersity. I gratefully acknowledge my
indebtedness to friends and colleagues who were good enough to comment on earlier drafts
of this paper Peter Hogg, David Lepofsky, James MacPherson, Rod Macdonald, David
Mullan, Richard Risk, Brian Slattery, Eric Tucker, and Alan Young. It is a particular pleasure
to thank Douglas Alderson, whose contribution far exceeded that expected of a research
assistant, and Carole Trussler and Anita Lee, whose word-processing skills, genial common
sense, and sheer professionalism again saw me through.
1 Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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law. For example, in Crevier v. A.G. Quebec,2 the Supreme Court
of Canada invalidated a provincial statutory scheme for the
regulation of the professions in Quebec, on the ground that it
violated section 96 of the Constitution Act by ousting the inherent
power of the superior courts to review for jurisdictional error the
decisions of the Professions Tribunal - an appellate tribunal
composed of provincially appointed members. In effect, this case
elevated a common law ground of judicial review to the level of a
constitutional limit upon the provinces' legislative powers to design
a system of administrative adjudication. Sometimes, a line of
authority first developed in constitutional law is later applied to non-
constitutional challenges to administrative action: the liberalization
of the law of standing is an important recent example.
3
Constitutional law can also be understood to include more
than the content of the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982. In its broader
sense it connotes the laws and legal principles that determine the
allocation of decision-making functions amongst the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government, and that define the
essential elements of the relationship between the individual and
agencies of the state. A constitutional character in this broad sense
can thus be attributed to many of the principles of statutory
interpretation the courts use to construe regulatory legislation,4 to
the doctrine of ultra vires,5 and to the duty of fairness which
provides an opportunity for interested individuals to participate
meaningfully in the making of decisions by public bodies.
In areas of concern to administrative law, the Charter has
undoubtedly expanded the potential intersections of the constitution,
2 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 [hereinafter Crevier].
3 Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607.
4 These include the presumptions against sub-delegation and the use of delegated powers
to impose taxation and retrospectively to remove substantive rights; the presumption against
the grant of legally unlimited governmental power surfaces in the strict interpretation of
privative clauses and in the implied limitations read into wide statutory discretion conferred
in subjective terms.
5 Compare Re Williams and A.G. Canada (1983), [1984] 6 D.LR. (4th) 329 (Ont. Div.
[VOi- 29 NO.I
Fundamental Justice
in the formal sense, and the common law. The question addressed
in this paper is the relationship between the constitutional standard
of the principles of fundamental justice when applied to public
administration, and the common law doctrines of judicial review,
especially the duty of fairness. To date, the Supreme Court of
Canada has been notably and somewhat uncharacteristically
unforthcoming. Thus in Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code,6 Lamer J. said that the legal framework within which
regulatory and other statutory programmes are administered
has developed its own regime of common and statutory law dealing with procedural
and substantial fairness. The ewtent to which s. 7 of the Charter can be invoked
in the realm of administrative law, its implications for administrative procedures,
and its relationship to the common law rules of natural justice and the duty of
fairness are not before this court, and it is preferable to develop that jurisprudence
on an ongoing case-by-case basis.
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
reads as follows:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
Despite the awkward phrasing of this provision, it seems now to be
generally agreed that whether a public authority has violated section
7 depends on a two-step analysis.
The first requirement is that an exercise of governmental or
statutory power must deprive an individual of the right to life, liberty
and security of the person. Section 7's impact upon the
administration of regulatory programmes and the delivery of
statutory benefits will largely depend on the range of interests that
are held to be included within the words "life, liberty and security of
the person."
The deliberate omission of property from section 7 is
unlikely to deter the courts from concluding that an interest with an
economic aspect can also be essential to liberty and security of the
6 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1176-77; see also Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1049 per Dickson C.J. [hereinafter Slaight Communications].
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person.7 For instance, a licence that is legally required to pursue a
profession or vocation may be regarded as a species of property
because of its economic value to the licence holder, and, thus, not
within the interests protected by section 7. However, a statutory
power to revoke such a licence can equally be characterized as
authorizing a deprivation of liberty and security of the person of the
licensee: revocation may prevent the individual from using her or
his skills, knowledge, and experience in order to be self-sufficient, to
maintain self-respect, and to contribute to society.8 Similarly,
terminating income support to, or evicting from public housing, a
person who depends upon government programmes of assistance for
the necessities of life may well be a deprivation of liberty and
security of the person.9 The potentially wide scope of the section
has been indicated in other areas of public regulation. Statements
have been made at the highest judicial level that the interests
protected by section 7 include the individual's freedom to make such
fundamental personal choices as the termination of a pregnancY 
0
7 See Irwin Toy Ltd v. A.G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 1003-1004 where, noting that
the deliberate omission of "property" from section 7 generally excluded economic rights, the
majority judgment did not find it necessary to decide "whether those economic rights
fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as
corporate-commercial economic rights." For a vigorous denunciation of judicial attempts in
general to include economic interests within section 7i and the British Columbia Court of
Appeal's decision in Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of B.C. (1989), 53 D.L.R. (4th)
171 [hereinafter Wilson] in particular, see M.D. Lepofsky, "Constitutional Law - Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Section 7 - A Problematic Judicial Foray Into Legislative Policy-Making:
Wilson v. Medical Services Commission" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 615.
8 See, in particular, Wilson, ibid; Re Khaliq-Kareemi (1989), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 505
(N.S.CA). And see Slaight Communications, supra, note 6 at 1054 where Dickson CJ.
affirmed the non-material aspects of labour.
9 Compare Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 (Ont.
CA.). And see more generally, I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter and Constitutionally
Protected Welfare" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L Rev. I; and M. Jackman 'The Protection of Welfare
Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L Rev. 257, where it is argued that section 7 may
impose a positive obligation upon government to provide the bare necessities of life. But
see Bernard v. Dartmouth Housing Authority (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (N.S.C.A.).
10 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 esp. at 171-72, per Wilson J.
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and the education of one's children in accordance with the dictates
of conscience
This article does not attempt a detailed analysis of the ambit
of the words "life, liberty and security of the person." However,
courts are likely to employ a common methodology to define both
the constitutionally protected interests and the principles of
fundamental justice: a resort to the basic values of our legal system
and its constitutional traditions.
Having established that they have been deprived of life,
liberty and security of the person, litigants invoking section 7 of the
Charter must also show that their deprivation was contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice. These, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held, are not limited to procedural fairness,12 although
they certainly include the common law duty to observe the rules of
natural justice or, their more contemporary analogue, the duty to act
fairly.13  Rather, the principles of fundamental justice embrace the
"basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process, but also
of other components of our legal system."
14
Any satisfying approach to the interpretation of the Charter
must consider the somewhat unusual circumstances in which the
Charter entrenched guarantees of individual rights and freedoms.
Unlike many constitutional declarations of rights, the Charter was
not the result of a colonial struggle for independence, a crushing
military defeat, or a revolution. It was, rather, an important,
11 R v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 [hereinafter Jones] esp. at 318-20, per Wilson J. The
expansive view adopted by Wilson J. in Morgentaler and Jones does not necessarily represent
the opinion of a majority of the Court.
1 2 Reference re Section 94(2) of the B.C Motor Vehicle Act RS.B.C., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
13 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter
Singh].
14 Supra, note 12 at 512, per Lamer J. And see E. Colvin, "Section Seven of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 560, where it is argued
that section 7 should be regarded as bringing within judicial review, the propriety of the legal
means selected by government for the attainment of social objectives, rather than the
legitimacy of the ends themselves, especially since the section appears with the cluster of
provisions entitled "Legal Rights." See also Reference re ss 193 and 195.1 (1)(c) of the Criminal
Code, supra, note 6.
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incremental step in the growth of Canada's self-definition, adopted
contemporaneously with the elimination of the remaining
constitutional subservience to the Parliament of the United
Kingdom: the power to amend the constitution.
The Charter is, therefore, as much the product of relatively
stable and mature systems of law and government, as it is an
addition to them. Its terms are to be understood in the context of
the public law traditions that have shaped the legal relationships
among institutions of government, and between the individual and
the state!5  This point was expressed elegantly by La Forest J.,
when, in the course of considering the role of section 7 in the
context of the criminal law, he said:
[W]hat is important is that the Charter provisions seem to me to be deeply
anchored in previous Canadian experience. By this, I do not mean that we must
remain prisoners of the past. I do mean, however, that in continuing to grope for
the best balance in specific contexts, we must begin with our own experience.
16
Of course, traditions themselves evolve, and may appear to point in
different directions. Indeed, the adoption of the Charter itself may
be regarded as evidence of the enhanced value now assigned by our
legal system to the interests that it protects. It is to that extent
forward-looking. Nonetheless, to read the Charter as a blueprint for
a new social and political ordering is to tear it from its historical and
constitutional contexts. Like the emergence of Canadian sovereignty
itself, our domestic public law has been characterized more by
evolution than by revolution.
It would be most unfortunate if the Charter came to be
regarded as the only relevant source of non-statutory law regulating
the relationship between individuals and the government whenever
the legality of administrative action is challenged for impinging on
15 Compare O.P.S.E.U. v. A.G. Ontario (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 689 (H.C.) and Osborne v.
Canada (Treasury Board) (1988), 52 D.LR. (4th) 241 (Fed. C.A.), where it was said that the
constitutional convention of political neutrality of the civil service provided an essential
limitation on the Charter's guarantees of freedom of speech and association when applied to
statutory restrictions on civil servants' political activities.
16 Thomson Newspapers Ltd v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 539 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers].
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a Charter-protected interest.17 The common law principles of
judicial review, and the presumptions developed by the courts as aids
to interpreting legislation that empowers or imposes duties on public
authorities, already constitute a legal framework for determining the
legality of governmental dealings with individuals; they also often
afford priority to many of the values and interests that have now
been elevated to the constitutional plane. It should only be
necessary to resort directly to the Charter when a ground of judicial
review that would otherwise have been available at common law has
clearly been abrogated by statute, or when the existing common law
of judicial review does not give to a Charter right the degree of
protection that the applicant is seeking.
II. LEGISLATION AND SECTION 7
Unless the power to override the Charter has been invoked,
statutory provisions that authorize the violation of an interest
protected by section 7, other than in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice, are of no legal force or effect. There are at
least three kinds of case in which an appeal may be made to the
principles of fundamental justice when a statute, either expressly or
by necessary implication, precludes resort to the common law as a
source of administrative justice.
18
17 But see the statement of Dickson CJ. in Slaight Communications, supra, note 6 at
1049 that "in the realm of value inquiry" (ie. in cases where the exercise of a statutory power
impinges on a Charter right) courts should determine the legality of the decision by applying
section 1 of the Charter, and not by the less well structured common law test of patent
unreasonableness.
18 Section 7 is not the only Charter provision relevant to ensuring the fairness of
administrative adjudication. For example, a statutory exclusion of members of the public from
a hearing may be an infringement of freedom of the press guaranteed by section 2(b): see
Pacific Press Ltd v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 1 F.C. 419
(C.A.); Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v. Kenney, [1990] 1 F.C. 425 (T.D.). And the
administration of a statutory regime that includes consequences of a penal nature for non-
compliance may be subject to section 11: see R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541; R v.
Shubley, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3.
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A. Statutory Exclusion or Limitation of the Duty of Fairness
First, legislation may directly exclude or curtail the right to
be heard which the common law would otherwise normally imply.
A good example is the provision in the Immigration Act that was the
subject of litigation in Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration.19 The legislation was held invalid because it denied
those applying for a redetermination of their claims to be refugees
the opportunity to appear in person before the Immigration Appeal
Board, and the right to be informed of, and to respond to, the
Minister's reasons for rejecting their claims.
Before the adoption of the Charter, courts from time to time
faced the argument that a specific statutory code of administrative
procedure precluded the court from implying additional procedural
rights from the common law duty of fairness.20 When the legislature
has obviously turned its attention to the procedures appropriate for
making particular administrative decisions, they should be regarded
as a complete code which, by implication, excludes any additional
procedural rights otherwise conferred by the common law.
Sometimes this argument has succeeded, and sometimes it has failed.
Much depends upon the detail with which the legislature or its
delegate 21 has elaborated the agency's rules, and the seriousness of
the injustice which may result if the reviewing court holds that it
19 Supra, note 13.
20 Compare Calgary Power Ltd v. Copithorne, [1959] S.C.R. 24; Furnell v. Whangarel High
Schools Board, [1973] A.C. 660 (N.Z.P.C.); Re Rafuse and Hambling (1979), [1980] 107 D.L.R.
(3d) 349 (N.S.S.C.T.D.). The "complete procedural code" argument is less likely to succeed
when it is used to deny the individual any procedural rights, rather than to limit them:
compare Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police (1978),
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafter Nicholson], and Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 [hereinafter Knight], with Singh, supra, note 13.
21 When the procedural code is in subordinate legislation made under a general power
to make rules of practice and procedure, the argument that the regulations are exhaustive of
procedural rights may also be defeated on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to
have intended the rule-making power to be exercised so as to exclude a right otherwise
implied by the common law duty of fairness. See, for example, Joplin v. Chief Constable of




cannot supply an omission of the legislature from the justice of the
common law.
Courts should continue to interpret statutory rules of
procedure against the background of the common law duty of
fairness. They should only resort to the Charter if it would plainly
be inconsistent with the terms or structure of the statutory
provisions establishing the administrative scheme to grant the
procedural right claimed by the applicant.
22
When a statute is held to exclude a particular aspect of the
right to be heard that would otherwise be implied by the common
law,23  a court may have to choose between two possible
interpretations of the principles of fundamental justice. They could
be interpreted as entrenching in the constitution the common law
duty of fairness in its entirety, or as entrenching only those aspects
that are essential to ensuring a right to participate in the
administrative process that is compatible with minimally acceptable
levels of procedural decency, accountability, and rationality in the
state's dealings with individuals. In Jones, Wilson J. suggested that
the principles of fundamental justice were only a distillation of the
common law rules of natural justice, 24 although she gave no example
of a procedural right which might be excluded from the
constitutional standard.
It is probably undesirable, however, for the courts to develop
in this way two sets of procedural standards applicable to any given
decision-making context: common law fairness and constitutional
fairness. Fairness is fairness, and it would unduly complicate the law
22 For an unduly broad notion of the concept of implied statutory exclusion in this
context, see the judgment of Pratte J. in Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Correctional
Service Canada), [1989] 3 F.C. 329 (C.A.) [hereinafter Gallant]; this case is discussed below,
section III. For another recent example, see Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Imnigration) (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 697 (Fed. C.A.), where the court invalidated section
48(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Act S.C. 1984, c. 21 because it gave an excessive
protection to information supplied by the R.C.M.P. to the Security Intelligence Review
Committee at the expense of individual rights.
23 As it was in Singh, supra, note 13.
24 Supra, note 11 at 322.
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to introduce gradations into the same situation.25 In any event, the
procedural requirements introduced by the courts into statutory and
other administrative schemes reflect a residual concept of justice, not
an ideal standard. To attempt to reduce them to an even smaller
constitutional core of procedural fairness is difficult to support as a
matter of either principle or practicality.
That section 7 does not use the words "duty of fairness" or
"the rules of natural justice" is not an indication that the principles
of fundamental justice should be interpreted as prescribing a lower
procedural standard on an issue within the scope of the common
law. Rather, employing a phrase that is not rooted in the common
law requirements of a fair hearing could equally be an indication
that the concerns of section 7 are not limited to traditional issues of
procedural propriety. It could also be an attempt to avoid the
historical baggage that at one time burdened the term, "the rules of
natural justice.
' 26
If it would be a mistake to define the principles of
fundamental justice as a stripped-down version of the common law
duty of fairness, it would be equally misguided to define the
principles of fundamental justice as the constitutional embodiment
of the common law doctrine of fairness, circa 1982. A recognition
that the content of the principles of fundamental justice may be
found in the common law as it develops over time is consistent with
the generally accepted notion that the constitution is capable of
growth: that it takes into account changing social and political
imperatives, and ideas about the appropriate relationship between
the individual and the state. Each component of our public law -
the constitution, statutes, and the common law - should contribute
to the development of the whole by responding to, and blending
25 Compare Slaight Communications, supra, note 17, where the relationship between
common law and Charter grounds for reviewing the exercise of discretion is discussed. The
Chief Justice seems to suggest that an intrusion on an interest protected by section 2 of the
Charter that passes muster under the more developed approach to section I should not be held
to be patently unreasonable at common law.
26 For example, the distinctions drawn between judicial and administrative functions, and
between rights and ,privileges; see further, infra, note 72.
[VOL. 29 NO.1
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with, the other tWO.2 7 Harmony is more satisfying than either
unison or discord.
B. Statutory Authorization
It may also be possible to invoke the principles of
fundamental justice to override the statutory provisions governing
the administration of a programme of regulation or benefit-delivery,
even though it may require an extension of an existing common law
ground of review. For instance, restrictions placed upon the scope
of the rule against bias by the doctrine of statutory authorization
mean that some instances of unfairness cannot be raised at common
law. Thus, if a power is conferred on a prosecuting authority to
appoint the members of the adjudicative body that will hear the
cases that authority prosecutes, the power is liable to be held
inoperative as a violation of the principles of fundamental justice.28
In the absence of statutory authorization, it would be a breach of
the present common law duty of fairness for a prosecutorial
authority to exercise control over an agency with the trappings and
27 The development of procedures legally required in connection with prison
administration, and the refusal and revocation of parole, is a good example: see A.W.
MacKay, "Inmates' Rights: Lost in the Maze of Prison Bureaucracy?" (1987-88) 11 Dalhousie
L.J. 698. There is surely also some connection between the constitutional guarantee of
equality and the dramatic change over the last few years in the judicial approach to the
interpretation of human rights legislation, especially by the Supreme Court of Canada.
There is a policy of judicial restraint in reviewing the interpretation by
administrative agencies of their enabling legislation in the context of economic regulation,
including labour relations. This policy is echoed in the reluctance of the courts to find in the
Charter constitutional limitations on legislative power to regulate or restrict economic rights.
For parallels in the constitutional and administrative law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of the United States, see A.C. Aman Jr., "Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency" (1988) 73 Cornell L.
Rev. 1101.
28 Compare MacBahz v. Ledennan, [1985] 1 F.C. 856 (C.A.), where section 2(e) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights was used for this purpose. For some statistical support for the
hypothesis that members of human rights tribunals who tend to find in favour of complainants
are more likely than others to be reappointed, see T. Flanagan, R. Knopff & K. Archer,
"Selection Bias in Human Rights Tribunals: An Exploratory Study' (1988) 31 Can. Pub.
Admin. 483.
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functions of a judicial tribunal such that a reasonable person would
apprehend the possibility of bias.
When a statute confers on members of an administrative
agency powers of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, the
courts have been reluctant to require them to arrange the work of
the agency so as to ensure that members who have participated in
the investigation or decision to prosecute do not also sit at the
adjudicative stage in the same case.29 The courts have explained
their non-intervention on the ground that it cannot be a breach of
the common law duty of impartiality for members to do what they
are clearly authorized by statute to do. Therefore, in respect of a
multi-functional agency with power over life, liberty and security of
the person, it can be argued, in principle, that the agency's enabling
legislation is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice insofar
as it authorizes members to adjudicate a case where their
involvement at an earlier stage of the proceeding would give rise to
a reasonable apprehension of bias.3°
Arguments available in principle do not always prevail in
practice, however. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that courts
have accepted that statutory authorization has ousted the common
law rule against bias in these cases because they regard the
establishment of regulatory agencies with multiple functions as a
reasonable legislative choice.31  The institutional design is not
inherently likely to produce such unfairness as to require the judicial
importation of restrictions on the apparent breadth of the statutory
powers conferred on the members of the agency. Administrative
29 See Brosseau v. Alberta Securities Commission, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 301; for a discussion,
see J.M. Evans, "Developments in Administrative Law: the 1988-89 Term" (1990) 1 Sup. Cl.
L. Rev. (2d) 1 at 64-72.
3 0 Ibid The appellant in Brosseau, did not pursue in the Supreme Court of Canada the
argument, rejected below, that the statute denied him the hearing before an impartial and
independent tribunal to which he was entitled under section 11(d) of the Charter. He appears
not to have argued that the administrative arrangements authorized by the legislation were
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, presumably because the cease trading order
did not deprive him of liberty or security of the person.
3 1Thus in Brosseau, ibid, the Court was prepared to apply the doctrine of statutory
authorization to conduct that the legislation did not expressly authorize.
[VOL. 29 NO.1
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arrangements that have not shocked the common law conscience
may not disturb constitutional sensitivities either.3 2
Nonetheless, the nature of the individual interests at stake
is an important determinant of the threshold of judicial intervention.
Courts are more likely to conclude that procedural fairness requires
a clearer separation of investigation and prosecution from
adjudication in an agency with power to deprive individuals of the
right to life, liberty and security of the person, than they are in
respect of a tribunal that is engaged in purely economic regulation.
33
But even so, it may be unnecessary to resort to the Charter to
satisfy these concerns. The content of the duty of fairness at
common law is not monolithic. The legislature should be presumed
only to authorize administrative arrangements that meet minimum
standards of procedural propriety. Thus, a court could reason that
if a member unnecessarily performs prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions in the same case, this may give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias that invalidates the agency's decision on
administrative law grounds.
A more difficult question is whether the principles of
fundamental justice impose a positive obligation on the legislature to
provide, within an administrative scheme that potentially threatens
a section 7 right, an opportunity for a determination (at first
instance or on appeal) by a body that is independent of the
government department responsible for enforcement. An inquiry
along these lines would lead the courts to ask questions that the
doctrine of statutory authorization puts beyond the scope of the
common law requirement of impartiality.
For instance, they might have to consider whether the
decisions of an apparently independent administrative tribunal whose
members hold office at the pleasure of the Minister are consistent
32 In the United States, it is settled that it will not normally be a breach of the Due
Process clause for a legislature to vest prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the same
agency: see Evans, supra, note 29.
33 It will not always be clear into which category a particular tribunal's powers fall: see
supra, notes 7 & 8.
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with the principles of fundamental justice3 4 They might also have
to determine whether section 7 requires an appeal to an
independent body from a decision by an official within a government
department,35 and if it does, how wide the grounds of appeal must
be to ensure a degree of scrutiny by an impartial and independent
body that satisfies the principles of fundamental justice.
While these latter questions can be regarded as direct
outcrops of the common law duty of fairness, they cannot be
answered on the basis of existing case law.36 It is perhaps not
surprising that the courts have so far upheld administrative schemes
that have been attacked as violating the principles of fundamental
justice because the legislation did not provide for a determination of
a person's rights by an independent decision-maker. Judicial
Compare Sethi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 2 F.C. 53
(T.D.); rev'd. 2 F.C. 552 (CA). See also Alex Couture Inc. v. A.G. Canada (1990), 69 D.L.R.
(4th) 635 (Qud. S.C.), where the Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 19 was
held to violate section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, because, inter alia, lay members'
ive-year term of appointment during good behaviour was revocable for cause, they were not
full time, and remained members of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in the
transitional period. This decision seems unlikely to survive on appeal.
For a somewhat sceptical view of the more expansive claims for independence
sometimes made by and on behalf of administrative tribunals, see R.W. Macaulay, Directions:
Review of Ontario's Regulatory Agencies (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1989) at 2.6 & 5.1.5.
Contrast with the Report of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force, Independence of
Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
1990) (Chair- E. Ratushny) at 43, where it is recommended that all full-time members of
designated agencies "exercising adjudicative functions" should be appointed during good
behaviour until retirement age.
35 But see Jones, supra, note 11 which seems inconsistent with the proposition that the
principles of fundamental justice invariably require an independent administrative adjudication.
Compare Mohammad v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 3 F.C. 308
(T.D.); see also Satiacum v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 2 F.C. 430 (C.A.)
(Canadian Bill of Rights). And see Vanguard Coatings and Chemicals Ltd v. Minister of
National Revenue, [1988] 3 F.C. 560 (C.A.) [hereinafter Vanguard Coatings] (right of appeal
from Minister's assessment of fair market value of goods not required by section 7).
36 It can be said that the duty of fairness is concerned with the impartiality of the
decision-maker, not institutional independence, and that impartiality and independence are
distinct concepts: see Valente v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at 685-87. However, a tribunal's
lack of independence from the government, especially when the government is a party to a
dispute before the tribunal, can be regarded as a particular manifestation of bias: a
reasonable person might suspect that a tribunal whose members are dismissable at will, or
whose appointments are renewable at the instance of a party, may be biased in favour of that
party.
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intervention in such cases would undoubtedly be a very significant
extension of the courts' involvement in issues of institutional design.
In assessing the claim that the principles of fundamental
justice guarantee an element of independence at the administrative
decision-making level, it is important to remember that the
constitution provides a right to judicial review, of somewhat
uncertain scope, of the proceedings of administrative agencies.
Thus, neither provincial legislatures, 3nor, perhaps, Parliament38 can
insulate their administrative tribunals from judicial review for
jurisdictional error. In addition, it is inherent in the supremacy of
the constitution that the courts cannot be excluded from reviewing
decisions by a public body that has either violated a right protected
by the Charter, or exceeded the legislative powers exercisable by the
level of government at which the body operates 9
The principles of fundamental justice are more likely to be
held to include a right to an effective opportunity to obtain judicial
review on non-constitutional grounds of the proceedings of any
tribunal that has the power to remove the right to life, liberty and
security of the person.40  Given the Crevier decision, and the
notoriously elastic concept of jurisdictional error, it would hardly be
a radical departure from our existing constitutional traditions to use
the Charter to effect this relatively modest reordering of the
relationship between the courts and the administration. The limited
37 See Crevier, supra, note 2.
38 See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Rifou, [1986] 3 F.C. 486 (C.A.).
39 See Constitution Ac 1982, s. 52(l). Section 7 of the Charter may, like most other
provisions of the Charter, be excluded by the exercise of the override provision contained in
section 33. However, because the constitutional power of the courts to review at least
provincial tribunals for jurisdictional excess is derived from section 96 of the Constitution Ac
1867, legislatures cannot directly insulate agencies from judicial scrutiny.
40 An argument may be made along these lines to challenge the validity of the provisions
recently added to the Immigration Act 1976-77 requiring leave to apply for judicial review to
be obtained from a single judge, with no right of appeal from a refusal of leave, and without
the guarantee of an oral hearing: Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1988, c. 52, ss 82.1-82.3 & 83.
There is, however, no judicial support for the proposition that a right of appeal
against a valid decision is included within the principles of fundamental justice: see Vanguard
Coatings, supra, note 35; R v. Robinson (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Alta. C.A.) (criminal
conviction).
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right of review thus provided may well be less satisfactory to an
individual who has received an adverse decision on a matter of life,
liberty and security of the person, than a right to appeal on the
merits from a departmental official to an independent administrative
tribunal or to a court. Nonetheless, it may suffice to provide that
minimum guarantee of impartiality in the decision-making process
that is inherent in the principles of fundamental justice, especially
considering the limitations on the institutional competence of courts
in matters of public administration.
41
C. Beyond Procedures
Section 7 does not confine the principles of fundamental
justice to issues of procedure typically included within the rules of
natural justice and the duty to act fairly.42  A statute establishing a
programme of regulation or benefit-delivery, and the administrative
structures created to implement it, may be impugned under section
7 of the Charter on grounds other than those of procedural fairness.
These may be more or less closely related to one of the existing
common law grounds of judicial review, or they may represent
radical departures from the kinds of issue that have so far been
regarded as justiciable.
Examples of the former might include statutory authorization
to infringe retrospectively an interest protected by section 7, an
unduly broad statutory delegation of discretion to an administrative
41 Compare Jones, supra, note 11 where La Forest J. refused to second-guess the
legislature's exercise of discretion in choosing between independence and expertise in allocating
the power to decide whether children not attending a main-stream school were receiving an
adequate education. See further, K. Delwaide & M. Walker, "Access to Courts and
Administrative Tribunals" in N.R. Finkelstein & B.M. Rogers, eds, Admnistrative Tribunals and
the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) c. 3.
42 See supra, notes 10 & 12. "Natural justice" may be taken for this purpose to include
the right to a decision that is minimally responsive in its findings of fact to the evidence
tendered, and in its conclusions of law to the legal arguments submitted: compare Re
O.P.S.E.U. and the Queen (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 651 at 659 (Ont. H.C.); Syndicat des eniployds
de production du Qudbec v. Canada Labour Relations Board, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412 at 420;




agency, or an unrestricted power to expropriate a person's home.
A section 7 Charter challenge to a statutory scheme could be
sustained on any of these grounds without any significant departure
from our constitutional traditions, because each ground is related to
a presumption of statutory interpretation already employed by the
courts to construe regulatory legislation. Since these presumptions
reflect certain fundamental values about the appropriate relationship
of the individual and agencies of the state, it would be a relatively
modest innovation to elevate them from the level of "a common-
law Bill of Rights"43 to that of the formal constitution.
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet provided much of
an analytical framework for determining which aspects of the
common law of judicial review of administrative action, including
the relevant principles of statutory interpretation, are included within
the principles of fundamental justice. Of course, many of the rights
entrenched by the Charter - such as freedom of speech and religion,
and freedom from arbitrary arrest and discrimination on such
grounds as race and ethnic origins - have received a measure of
recognition at common law, either in specific rules or presumptions
of statutory interpretation, or in a less clearly articulated judicial
conception of individual liberty. A search for the non-procedural
content of the principles of fundamental justice in "the basic tenets
of our legal system" will often be a difficult exercise.
The potential problems can be glimpsed by considering
whether the statutory delegation of standardless discretionary power
authorizing an agency to infringe a right will trigger the application
of section 7 of the Charter. There are undoubtedly reasons for
thinking that it would be consistent with our constitutional and legal
traditions for the courts to conclude that the principles of
fundamental justice limit the undue delegation of discretion.44
43To use John Willis's wonderfully felicitous description of the common law grounds of
judicial review of administrative action and the presumptions of statutory interpretation: 3.
Willis, "Administrative Law and the British North America Act" (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 251
at 274.
44 Compare Morgentaler, supra, note 10 where Dickson CJ. and Lamer 3. impugned the
Criminal Code, section 251(4)(c) on the ground that, to empower therapeutic abortion
committees to determine whether to approve an abortion by reference to threats posed by the
pregnancy to a woman's "health," was too vague to satisfy the principles of fundamental justice.
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First, the objections to excessive delegation of power at any
level in our government touch upon values that are sufficiently
important to rank as constitutional in nature: for example,
governmental accountability, limitation of the potential for the abuse
of power, and individuals' interest in certainty in their dealings with
the government. Secondly, the common law grounds of judicial
review already reflect these concerns in a variety of doctrines.
45
Thirdly, a concern about the dangers of the delegation of discretion
to public officials is apparent in the writings of legal and
constitutional commentators. In particular, Dicey stated that one
meaning of the Rule of Law, itself an underpinning of civil liberties,
was that individuals should suffer in their goods or person only for
distinct 6reaches of the law, and not at the discretion of some public
official.4 6 Indeed, only twenty-five years ago the notion that
governmental discretion should be kept to a minimum received a
stamp of approval in Ontario in the McRuer Report 47 and the
legislation that it inspired. Finally, section 1 of the Charter provides
Compare Wilson, supra, note 7. In Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code,
supra, note 6 the Court affirmed that the principles of fundamental justice require that
criminal sanctions be imposed only for conduct that is sufficiently precisely defined as to give
fair notice and not to confer undue discretion on law enforcement authorities and courts. But
see Vanguard Coatings, supra, note 35 where the delegation to a minister of the power to
assess fair value for the purpose of tax liability, without any right of appeal, was said not to
contravene the Rule of Law.
45 See, for example, the cases holding that, in exercising a statutory power to enact
delegated legislation, the rule-making body cannot sub-delegate to another, or to itself, the
power to make significant policy decisions on an ad hoc basis: R v. Joy Oil Co. Ltd (1963),
41 D.L.R. (2d) 291 (Ont. C.A.); Verdun (City of) v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222; Brant
Daiy Co. v. Milk Commission of Ontario, [1963] S.C.R. 131; Canadian Institute of Public Real
Estate Companies v. Toronto (City of, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter C.I.P.R.E.C.]. And see
Re Garden Gulf Court Motel Inc and Island Telephone Co. (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 281
(P.E.I.S.C.) and Re Irving Oil and Public Utilities Commission (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 448
(P.E.I.S.C.) for examples of judicial disapproval of the exercise of unstructured discretion by
a regulatory agency.
4 6 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
MacMillan, 1959) at 188-93.
47 Ontario, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (The McRuer Report) (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1968) (Commissioner J.C. McRuer).
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that any limitations on Charter rights must be "prescribed by law."48
This may illustrate the preference of our constitutional culture for
rules over discretion.
On the other hand, a preference for government by rules
rather than by discretion can easily be characterized as a surrogate
for a direct attack upon the substantive content of legislation
enacted to curb the abuse of economic power, to redistribute wealth,
and to tackle other social problems that private law and the market
have not resolved. Dicey himself was certainly no friend of
"collectivism";49 however, no industrialized nation subscribes to this
version of economic laissez-faire and the minimalist state. Discretion
has been essential in creating and administering regulatory
programmes when legislators could identify only the broad outline of
the problem the agency was to tackle, and even less of the solution.
Despite the enthusiasm for reducing discretion evident in the
McRuer Report and its aftermath, and more recently in federal
programmes of "re-regulation",50 it is difficult to assert that statutory
grants of wide discretion to administrative agencies are contrary to
our constitutional and governmental traditions.
It may be suggested that the kind of regulatory legislation
that requires broad discretionary powers will not be subject to the
principles of fundamental justice because section 7 does not apply
to property rights. It is much more difficult to justify subjecting to
official discretion the narrower range of fundamental individual
freedoms denoted by the right to life, liberty and security of the
person. This is certainly a relevant consideration, although it is not
48 See, for example, Re Ontario Fihn and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board
of Film Censors (1983), 147 D.L.R. (3d) 58 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd. (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 766
(Ont. C.A.); Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, [1985] 1 F.C.
85 at 89 (C.A.); Re Information Retailers Association of Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan
Toronto (Municipality of) (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.).
49 See R.A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1980) at 222-25.
50 Some licensing decisions must now be made primarily by reference to the fitness of
the applicants to provide the service, without regard to wider considerations of "public
necessity and convenience": see, for example, National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1985 (3d
Supp.), c. 28, s. 3 (statement of national transportation policy), s. 72 (domestic air services
licences), s. 201 (extra-provincial trucking licences).
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conclusive. For instance, some statutory schemes that clearly
impinge upon section 7 interests are riddled with discretion: the
administration of criminal justice, the penal system, and immigration
control are examples. Moreover, we are still in the early stages of
defining the scope of interests protected by section 7; the indications
so far are that the courts will be neither able nor willing to deny
that an interest can qualify as a right to liberty and security of the
person merely because it has an economic aspect. 51
It should also be noted that the interests protected by
section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights52 ("rights and
obligations") are much broader than those that trigger the
application of section 7. It is true, of course, that the protection
afforded seems more obviously limited to the procedural ("a fair
hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice").
However, it is quite possible that the kind of thinking about
essential notions of justice in which the courts have engaged under
the Charter may well lead to an interpretation of section 2(e) that
extends beyond the traditional concerns of the common law rules
about procedural fairness. For example, a person whose rights are
subject to the decision of an unlimited and unstructured statutory
discretion has less opportunity to influence the decision-maker than
one whose rights may only be infringed in clearly defined
circumstances - a reality that is reflected in a lower level of
procedural protection.5 3 And reasons for decision may be required
to demonstrate that the evidence and arguments advanced at the
hearing really were heard by the tribunal.
51 See supra, note 7 for example; see also Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code, supra, note 6 at 1174-78 where, in lengthy obiter dicta, Lamer J. limits the
scope of the rights protected by section 7 to those that have traditionally been within the
'Judicial domain": physical liberty, control over one's physical and mental integrity, and
freedom from the threat of punishment for non-compliance with the provisions of a regulatory
scheme.
52 R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III.
53 See, for example, Knight, supra, note 20 at 683, where L'Heureux-Dub6 J. said, "Since
the respondent could be dismissed at pleasure, the content of the duty of fairness would be
minimal:' And see Iddak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 267 (Ont.
H.C.), where the discretionary nature of the Minister's power to extradite similarly reduced
the procedural content of the principles of fundamental justice.
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As is so often the case in public law, there may not be a
universal answer to the question posed. Whether a statute
authorizing, in wide discretionary terms, an official or body to
deprive someone of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice may
depend on particular circumstances. Whether or not the argument
is made through section 1 of the Charter,54 it is likely that courts will
take into consideration practical necessities when deciding if a
particular scheme satisfies the principles of fundamental justice.55
For example, discretion may be more acceptable at the investigative,
recommendatory, and prosecutorial stages of the administrative
process than in the final determination of an individual's rights.5 6 A
power in the Cabinet to decide whether to give effect to a positive
decision or recommendation made by another body after a hearing
is also likely to survive a challenge based on the standardless
delegation of discretion.5 7 Moreover, some kinds of "liberty" within
section 7 may be regarded as more fundamental than others, and
will require greater specificity in the definition of the circumstances
in which they may be infringed5 8
It has been emphasized that the precise content of the principles of fundamental
justice varies with the context to which they are to be applied; see, for example, Singh, supra,
note 13 at 213; Gallant, supra, note 22 at 341-42.
55 Wilson J. in Singh, supra, note 13 at 218-19 suggested that it would be very difficult
to justify a violation of section 7 by reference to a utilitarian weighing of the administrative
costs of compliance with the principles of fundamental justice. Compare the statement of
Spence J. in CLRRE.C, supra, note 45 at 10-11 that "practical difficulties" in limiting a
discretion were not relevant to the legal question of whether the city's by-law was invalid
because it contained standards that were no more precise than those in the statute.
56 Compare R v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 172 (C.A.) (no onus on
Crown to establish that the criminal law is being enforced equally in accordance with section
15 of the Charter); R v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 410-12 (power to require fingerprints).
In contrast, it is accepted that it is a fundamental tenet of our legal system that criminal
offences must not be defined so vaguely that individuals cannot be sure whether their conduct
is unlawful: Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 6.
57 For example, the power of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to decide whether it
is in the public interest to release from custody a person found unfit to plead, or a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
58 Thus the interest in freedom from imprisonment or other form of physical constraint
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If the principles of fundamental justice extend to this issue,
then a lot can be said for adopting a cautious approach, in which
the courts see their primary role as prodding the agency to consider
appropriate ways for structuring and confining the discretion given
to it. Provided that the agency has made good faith attempts to
strike a balance at the administrative level between rule and
discretion, the courts should be very slow to intervene by means of
the principles of fundamental justice. This approach ensures that
primary responsibility for this exercise rests with the body most able
to perform it, and that constitutional review takes the form of a
dialogue, rather than a judicial monologue delivered from inside a
black box.
III. THE COMMON LAW AND BEYOND
This part considers the question of whether, and in what
circumstances, the courts are justified in finding in the principles of
fundamental justice, a ground of review that is inconsistent with, or
not included in, the common law rules that regulate the legality of
administrative action. Again, important clues to the answer are to
be found in those "basic tenets of our legal system" that relate to
the scope of judicial review of administrative agencies.
Some courts appear to have proceeded on the premise that
the Charter has made the common law duty of fairness redundant
when the tribunal under scrutiny has the power to deprive someone
of life, liberty and security of the person,5 9 and that a reviewing
court need only consider whether the agency acted in accordance
is almost certain to attract maximum protection, whereas a power to revoke a driver's licence
in the interest of public safety may permit more discretion.
59 See, in particular, the cases dealing with prison discipline and parole revocation where
courts appear to have regarded pre-Nicholson decisions (see supra, note 20) as precluding
common law procedural rights: 1?. v. Smith (1988), 34 Admin. L.R. 148 (Ont. H.C.) provides
a good illustration. And compare, Slaight Communications, supra, note 6 where Dickson C.J.
suggested that, when an exercise of discretion impinges on a Charter-protected right, such as
freedom of speech, a reviewing court should consider whether it can be upheld under section
1, rather than whether it is "patently unreasonable" at common law. Curiously, Dickson C.J.
seems here to be using the Charter to uphold a discretionary decision that might have been
found invalid at common law.
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with the principles of fundamental justice. In my view, courts should
still first consider whether the applicant has established a ground of
review at common law, and only resort to the Charter if the answer
is negative, or if the remedy sought is not available at common law
or under statute.
c6
First, keeping the Charter as a last resort reminds the court
that it is being asked to intervene (or to grant a remedy) in
circumstances where judges have previously thought that they should
not. When there are no authorities upholding the right claimed, as
a matter of common law, or, more telling still, when judicial
decisions actually deny that the right or remedy is part of the
common law of judicial review, clearly the Charter is being invoked
as a source of a new legal right. While novelty is not a conclusive
argument for rejecting a Charter challenge, it should certainly signal
that judicial caution is appropriate, especially since the right, if
recognized, will have the preferred status of a constitutional right
and thus, to a large extent, be immune from legislative modification
or repeal. For this latter reason also, constitutional law should be
a last resort in the resolution of disputes to which public authorities
are party.
Secondly, there is a danger that, if courts by-pass the
common law and go straight to the Charter for a solution, a rich
source of thought and experience about law and government will be
overlooked or lost altogether, and will eventually atrophy. The
common law of judicial review of administrative action represents
the results of courts' grappling, case by case, and often only
inferentially, with issues of administrative justice and the appropriate
allocation of roles between courts and agency in administrative law.
61
For a suggestion that section 241) of the Charter grants courts more flexibility in the
choice of remedy that is "appropriate and just in the circumstances," see Smith, ibid; compare
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. Kodellas (1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 143 (Sask. CA.)
[hereinafter Kodellas].
61 For an early and perceptive consideration of the application of the principles of
fundamental justice to administrative law, see L. Tremblay, "Section 7 of the Charter
Substantive Due Process?" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 201 at 247ff. The apparent inconsistency
between the Charter and the policy of judicial restraint towards administrative tribunals that
the courts have intermittently pursued since 1979 has been identified and discussed by
Professor David Mullan; see, in particular, D.J. Mullan, "Judicial Deference to Administrative
Decision-Making in the Age of the Charter" (1985-86) 50 Sask. L Rev. 203, and D.J. Mullan,
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If the ground of review claimed by the applicant is not
available at common law, a reading of the relevant jurisprudence
and literature may indicate that the reasons relate, for example, to
issues of institutional competence, or legitimate political choice, and
are equally applicable when the Charter is invoked to provide a legal
basis for the right. To attempt to attribute meaning to the
principles of fundamental justice without first carefully considering
the scope and limits of other legal bases of judicial review, and their
rationales, is to interpret the Charter in a legal, political, and
historical vacuum. Conversely, it would impoverish the development
of the common law, if the Charter became virtually the only non-
statutory source of law protecting the fundamental individual rights
described in section 7.
It is my contention that the common law pertaining to the
judicial review of administrative action reflects courts' notions of
procedural fairness, legality, and rationality in administrative decision-
making. Therefore, section 7 of the Charter should normally not be
interpreted to confer additional protection on individuals, or to alter
significantly the relationship of courts and tribunals. It is
appropriate to presume that procedural duties not imposed by the
common law duty of fairness are not among the basic tenets of our
legal system, and are thus not included in the principles of
fundamental justice. However, there will be circumstances in which
this presumption is displaced by countervailing considerations.
62
The judgments delivered in the Federal Court of Appeal in
Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution, Inmate Disciplinary Court
63
"Natural Justice: The Challenges of Nicholson, Deference Theory and the Charter" in
Formation permanente barreau du Quebec, Ddveloppements rdcents en droit adininistratif
(Cowansville, Qudbec: Yvon Blais, 1987) 1 at 30ff. See also F.L. Morton and L.A. Pal, "ie
Impact of the Charter of Rights on Public Administration" (1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin. 221.
62There are analogies between the appropriateness of judicial expansions of existing
grounds of judicial review of administrative action through section 7 of the Charter, and of the
courts' reconsideration of the substantive and procedural elements of the criminal law that
are attributable to the judiciary, rather than to Parliament. The Supreme Court of Canada
has expressed views about the impact of the Charter on criminal law jurisprudence consistent
with the relationship between section 7 and administrative law grounds of review suggested
in this paragraph.
63 Supra, note 42.
[VOL. 29 NO.I
Fundamental Justice
appear to claim for the Charter more than the modest role suggested
above. In this case, the court apparently concluded that a tribunal's
exercise of discretion to refuse the applicant's request to be legally
represented was not unfair at common law, but was contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter. This
conclusion is not easy to justify. After all, the procedural content
of both standards is largely judicially defined, and both address the
same concerns: the accommodation of individual dignity, reliability
in decision-making, and governmental accountability on the one
hand, with the practical exigencies of administration on the other.
The assumption underlying Howard is that the Charter
inevitably increases the role played by the courts in the supervision
of administrative agencies; and, in particular, that section 7 requires
the courts to determine for themselves whether, in a given case, the
applicant should have been permitted legal representation. At
common law, the courts' role was more residual: to ensure that the
tribunal recognized that it had a discretion, and that it exercised it
on the basis of relevant considerations, and not in a way that was
patently unreasonable.
64
Another difference between the procedural standard set by
the common law and the principles of fundamental justice was
identified in the Federal Court of Appeal by Pratte J. in Gallant v.
Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Conectional Service Canada).65 In
this case a prisoner challenged the legality of his transfer to a higher
security institution. He argued that the reasons given for his
proposed transfer had been lacking in detail and specificity. Thus,
he was denied a meaningful opportunity to rebut the allegation that
he had been involved in a criminal conspiracy in prison to extort
money from other inmates, which he used to pay for drugs smuggled
into the prison for his use.
641R v. Secretary of State for the Home Deparmen exparte Tarrant, [1985] Q.B. 251 (Div.
Ct). It is possible that the text somewhat overstates the distinction drawn in the Federal
Court of Appeal between the common law and the Charter on the question of legal
representation. Thus, Thurlow CJ. in Howard, ibid at 663 seems to say that section 7 only
guarantees a right to counsel in cases where, in England, a court would hold that a refusal
was an unreasonable exercise of discretion.
65 Supra, note 22.
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Recognizing the difficulty that the applicant would have, if
innocent, in responding to allegations that were so lacking in
particulars, Pratte J. nonetheless held that the respondent had not
breached the common law duty of fairness. To require additional
information might well reveal the identity of the prison authorities'
informants. This might put at risk the personal safety and lives of
inmates, and discourage others from providing similar intelligence in
the future, thus making it much more difficult to maintain order in
prisons. To accede to the applicant's request, Pratte J. concluded,
would be inconsistent with the statutory objective in conferring
powers upon those responsible for our prisons: efficient and
effective prison administration.
Turning to the applicant's argument that the terms of the
notice were too imprecise to satisfy section 7, Pratte J. held that,
while the content of the principles of fundamental justice was not
the same in every situation, it could not be reduced by virtue of an
incompatibility between the particular procedural right claimed by an
individual and the statutory scheme. The constitutional status of the
principles of fundamental justice, he argued, makes it impossible to
maintain that an essential requirement of procedural fairness has
been impliedly excluded or attenuated by the legislature.
Pratte . held that the prison authorities had violated section
7 of the Charter by serving a notice that did not give the applicant
a meaningful opportunity to respond. However, he concluded that
government's legitimate concerns for the physical safety of inmates
and the requirements of prison administration clearly pointed to the
need to shield the identity of informers. Without requiring evidence
or argument from the respondent, he held that this limitation on the
principles of fundamental justice was justifiable under section 1.
Pratte J.'s analysis did not attract the support of the other
members of the court, Marceau and Desjardins jj.66 However, it
raises this interesting question: are factors that tend to limit the
66 Ibid. Marceau J. held that the notice breached neither the common law, nor section
7. In a powerful dissenting judgment, Desjardins J. held that the need to protect the identity
of prison informants did not excuse the sparse terms of the notice given to Gallant. Drawing
upon constitutional cases in the United States, Desjardins J. said at 350-51: 'when
confidential information is relied on by prison authorities so as to justify a disciplinary
measure, the record must contain some underlying factual information from which the
authorities can reasonably conclude that the informer was credible or the information reliable."
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content of the common law duty of fairness in a particular statutory
and administrative context irrelevant when deciding whether the
procedures followed comply with the principles of fundamental
justice? Of course, courts may continue their retreat from the
demanding burden and standard of proof that they seemed originally
to impose on those invoking section 1. If they do, it may not make
much difference in most cases whether governmental concerns, such
as resource allocation, expeditiousness, and administrative efficiency,
are factored into the definition of how much process is due in order
to satisfy the principles of fundamental justice, or into the
justification for limiting a constitutionally required procedural right.
Nonetheless, Pratte J.'s judgment poses an important
theoretical question about the roles of legislation, the common law,
and the Charter in establishing the legal standards with which
administrative procedures must comply. It is one thing to determine
the content of the duty of fairness in a particular situation by asking
whether the procedural right claimed would frustrate the proper
administration of the statutory programme in question. It is quite
another, however, to ask whether the structure or language of the
agency's enabling legislation has expressly or impliedly reduced or
excluded a procedural protection that, given the other elements of
the administrative and statutory contexts, the common law otherwise
would have imposed.
The relationship between the common law duty of fairness
and the statute under which the administrative body operates is
symbiotic. It is certainly both unrealistic and unilluminating to
ascribe the application and content of the duty of fairness primarily
to legislative intention and statutory interpretation. 67  Indeed,
67 Statutory interpretation cannot account for the application of the duty of fairness to
the exercise either of governmental powers that are not derived from statute [see, for example,
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984), [1985] 1 A.C. 374
(H.L.)], or of disciplinary powers against members and non-members by non-statutory bodies,
such as sporting associations and self-regulatory groups, whose authority flows from contract
and de facto control over the activity in question [see, for example, McInnes v. Onslow - Fane,
[1978] 1 W.LR. 1520 (Ch.); R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, exparte Datafin pkc (1986),
[1987] Q.B. 815 (C.A.)]. More importantly, to describe the courts as merely engaged in the
interpretation of the statute obscures the extent to which the principles of statutory
construction are themselves the creation of the judiciary.
The opposite view has been propounded recently in the High Court of Australia,
where Brennan J. said in Koa v. West (1985), 159 C.L.R. 551 at 610: "[t]here is no free-
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delivering the majority's reasons for judgment in the recent case of
Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19,68 L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
suggested that the right to Srocedural fairness is "autonomous of the
operation of any statute,"'  and depends on a consideration of the
nature of the decision to be made, the relationship between the
individual affected and the public authority, and the effect of the
decision on the interests of the individual.70 That legislation may,
of course, exclude or vary the duty in particular situations by express
words or necessary implication does not support the view that
statute is the ultimate source of the duty.71 However, it is also true
that, beyond a certain level of generality, it is unprofitable, in the
absence of a context, to attempt to define the circumstances in
which the duty of fairness applies and, more importantly, what is its
content.
Thus, whether the notice Gallant received gave him a
reasonable opportunity, as a matter of fairness, to rebut the
allegations made against him must be determined by reference to all
the circumstances. This involves striking a balance amongst a
number of interests: some may support his resistance to a proposed
deterioration in his conditions of imprisonment (the public interest
in accurate decision-making, and his interest in mounting an
effective defence, for instance); others point in the opposite
direction (the safety of other inmates, and prison security). The
standing common law right to be accorded natural justice by the repository of a statutory
power. There is no right to be accorded natural justice which exists independently of statute."
Referring to Civil Service Unions at 611, he left open the question whether "the common law
determines not only the scope of the prerogative but the procedure by which it is exercised."
68 Supra, note 20. For a perceptive analysis, see DJ. Mullan, Remarks (1990) 43 Admin.
L.R. 230.
69 Knight, supra, note 20 at 668.
70 These factors had previously been identified in Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution
(1984), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 at 653 as the principal determinants of the existence of the right
to be heard.
71 Having concluded that the common law did not normally subject the exercise of a
power to dismiss without cause to the duty of fairness, the minority, in Knight, supra, note
20, did look to the terms of the statute for an indication of legislative intention to supply the
omission of the common law, as it were.
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authorizing prison officials to transfer inmates are as much a part of
the determination of what constitutes fair notice as an assessment of
the deprivations of those who are transferred. As the majority of
the court seems to have accepted, there is no basis for stating that,
unlike the common law duty of fairness, the content of the
constitutionally entrenched principles of fundamental justice is to be
determined without reference to statutory objectives and the
workability of the administrative scheme.
There is little reason for supposing that the Charter should
be interpreted as an invitation to the judiciary to rethink the
relationship between courts and administrative agencies in the way
suggested by Howard, or to redefine the factors relevant to
determining procedural fairness, as Pratte J. proposed in Gallant.
It is at least as plausible to maintain that the reference point for
defining the content of the principles of fundamental justice - the
basic tenets of our legal system - includes a recognition that courts
have a limited institutional competence to design procedural detail
for the wide variety of administrative agencies that they supervise;
that the content of fairness is the result of balancing often
competing factors; and that the perspective of the agency can be as
valuable to the elaboration of the requirements of fairness in
specific contexts as that of a reviewing court. These considerations
do not lose their relevance simply because the standard of fairness
being applied has its source in the constitution rather than the
common law.
A possible response to this general line of argument is that
the constitutional entrenchment of certain rights in section 7 of the
Charter gives them a preferred legal status, and that the principles
of fundamental justice should accordingly be interpreted as providing
more extensive procedural protection than that afforded by the
common law. In particular, it can be contended, the courts have
historically played a central role in the interpretation of the
constitution and its application to specific situations. Administrative
agencies have not enjoyed the same latitude in deciding questions of
constitutional significance that they have been given when
interpreting their own enabling legislation.
These are undeniably substantial arguments for the view that,
in a Charter challenge to an administrative agency's procedure, a
reviewing court is not confined to the procedural protections
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provided by the common law when determining the content of the
principles of fundamental justice. However, for the following
reasons the arguments are probably not conclusive.
First, it is a truism that the procedural content of the duty
of fairness varies according to context, including the seriousness for
the individual of an adverse decision by the agency. The more
important the interest at stake, the more extensive the procedural
rights normally afforded by the common law. While the courts may
have been slow in the past to protect the interests in personal
liberty of such typically powerless groups as inmates of prisons and
psychiatric facilities, parolees, and those subject to immigration
control and deportation,72 they ought to see in section 7 evidence
of the high societal value placed on the individual interests there
described, and give them their due weight when determining the
procedural protections appropriate as a matter of common law.
Secondly, the fact that an issue has a constitutional
dimension does not necessarily mean that a reviewing court should
invariably substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency that decided it at first instance. For instance, some recent
cases indicate that, despite earlier judicial pronouncements to the
contrary, courts may be prepared to review by a standard of
reasonableness, rather than correctness, agencies' findings of fact
72 Wilson J. in Singh, supra, note 13 at 209-11 was no doubt referring to such cases when
she said that distinctions once drawn at common law and under the Canadian Bill of Rights
between rights and privileges, and between refusals and revocations, would not form the basis
of the definition of the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of the person.
However, it has been some time since our appellate courts determined the application of the
rules of natural justice, and more particularly the duty of fairness, by the unhelpful conceptual
categories used before Nicholson, supra, note 20. The emergence of the duty of fairness
enables courts to distinguish older casesthat were decided on the assumption that implied
procedural rights attached only to tribunals exercising "judicial" powers, and had to resemble
a trial. The nature of the interest affected, and the seriousness of the impact of the decision
upon it, may still be relevant to the content of the procedures due, whether at common law
or under the Charter.
Compare the statement by Lamer J. in Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code, supra, note 6 at 1176 that, whatever the relationship between section 7 and
administrative law, section 7 is engaged by statutory "odies, such as parole boards and mental
health review tribunals, that assume control over decisions affecting an individual's liberty and
security of the person ... because they involve the restriction to an individual's physical liberty
and security of the person, where the judiciary has always had a role to play as guardian of
the administration of the justice system."
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with constitutional significance in division of powers questions.73
The reasons for judicial restraint in reviewing agencies' decisions on
matters in which their expertise is relevant do not lose their cogency
simply because the question in issue also has a constitutional
dimension. This observation is equally applicable to the choice of
administrative procedure.
There is a third, and related, indication that the courts'
supervisory role is not necessarily different in kind because a
constitutional question arises in the course of an administrative
proceeding. Most judicial opinion supports the proposition that
many administrative tribunals, regardless of whether they are "courts
of competent jurisdiction" for the purpose of section 24(1) of the
Charter, have implied authority to rule on the validity of any
provision in their enabling legislation, or procedure, that is
challenged on Charter grounds in order to dispose of a proceeding
otherwise within its mandate.74 In Cuddy Chicks Ltd v. Ontario
(Labour Relations Board),75 the issue was whether it was contrary to
section 15 of the Charter to exclude agricultural workers from the
protection provided by representation by a trade union certified as
their sole bargaining agent under the Labour Relations Act.
76
Counsel 'for the Board conceded that any ruling on the question
would be subject to judicial review for correctness, not merely
reasonableness. Although the majority of the court noted this
concession, with apparent approval, this point was not argued by the
parties and should not necessarily be regarded as settled. For
example, it may be appropriate, when applying section 1 of the
Charter, for a court to defer to (or be informed by) the Board's
assessment of the probable social and economic impact on employers
and employees of extending the Act's protection to agricultural
workers.
73 See J.M. Evans, "Administrative Tribunals and Charter Challenges" (1988) 2 Can. .
Admin. L. & Prac. 14 at notes 24, 91 & 95.
74 See generally ibid
75 (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. C.A.).
76 R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 2(b).
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One reason for permitting administrative agencies to
determine Charter challenges at first instance is that their members'
experience and accumulated understanding of the subject-matter of
their mandate, broadly understood, may be relevant to the Charter's
application to the statutory scheme. If the judiciary is not prepared
to defer to agencies' procedural choices when challenged under
section 7, even though they do not violate the duty of fairness,
reviewing courts should nonetheless carefully take into account the
reasons given by tribunals for their conduct. The difference
between being educated by, and deferring to, an agency is one of
degree.
In the decade since Nicholson,77 the courts have used the
greater flexibility apparently possessed by the duty of fairness to
determine some minimal requirements for administrative procedures.
This has often involved the need to strike a balance of justice
between individuals adversely affected by the exercise of a statutory
power, and beneficiaries of the legislative programme. Courts have
increasingly recognized that the knowledge and insights of the
members of the agency may be very relevant to this task. 78 The
constitution's inclusion of an open-textured duty upon government
to observe the principles of fundamental justice does not necessarily
mean that judges are totally at liberty to re-evaluate the scope of
the procedural protections that are already required as a matter of
fairness.
A better response to the enhanced status conferred by
section 7 of the Charter upon the right to life, liberty and security
of the person may be to extend the common law procedural
entitlements connected with these interests. In other words, the
77 Supra, note 20.
78 This point was very clearly put recently in R v. Norfolk County Council, exparte M.,
[1989] 2 All E.R. 359 (Q.B.), where the court held that the duty of fairness required that an
individual be given notice and an opportunity to respond to allegations that might result in
that individual's name being entered on a non-statutory child abuse register. However,
designing procedures that would adequately balance fairness to the alleged abuser and the
protection of children required the experience of those engaged in child welfare. A court
should be reluctant to invalidate for unfairness any procedures adopted by the agency after
a good faith consideration of these competing claims. See also Toronto Independent Dance
Enterprise v. Canada Council, [1989] 3 F.C. 516 at 527 (T.D.).
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Charter should be regarded as an additional factor for courts to
consider when deciding whether to develop the common law in a
particular direction, or to reverse a previously settled question.
79
Three points can be made in favour of this approach.
First, it will help to contain the uncertainty introduced by
the Charter to subject to the doctrine of precedent the courts' power
to rewrite public law. Thus, a judge should not normally be free to
reconsider in the light of section 7 of the Charter a higher court's
decision that the procedural entitlement claimed by the applicant
was not available at common law. For instance, consider the well-
established rule that the common law duty of fairness does not apply
to the exercise of purely legislative powers. A trial judge ought not
to decide that this rule, although endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada,80 is contrary to the principles of fundamental justice and is
inapplicable, therefore, to the making of rules that threaten the right
to life, liberty and security of the person.
81
A second advantage of resorting first to the common law for
an appropriate procedural protection for a right included in section
7 of the Charter is that it does not preclude a legislative response to
79 Compare the suggestion by McIntyre J. in R W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603 that, even where the Charter does not apply directly to the
common law governing the relationship of private parties, its values should influence the
courts' development of the law. But see R v. Hdben [1990] 2 S.C.R. (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
Hebert], where the Court based a new rule for excluding unfairly obtained confessions directly
on section 7 of the Charter. Since the restricted nature of the Canadian common law in this
area had provoked criticism from commentators, was disliked by some judges, and was out of
line with more recent developments in the Commonwealth and the United States, it would
have been quite easy for the Court to modify the common law itself, citing section 7 as an
additional reason for re-thinking the issue.
8 0 A.G. Canada v. Inuit Tapisrisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.
81 Compare the judgment of Muldoon 3. in National Anti-Poverty Organization v. A.G.
Canada (1988), [1989] 1 F.C. 208, where he held that he was not bound by the decision in
Inuit Tapirisat, ibid., because the Supreme Court of Canada had decided the case before the
adoption of the Charter, and the consequent revival of the Canadian Bill of Rights, including
the guarantee in section 2(e) of a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed ([1989] 3 F.C. 684), stating that
it was not open to the trial judge to conclude that Inuit Tapirisat was not binding because the
Supreme Court had overlooked section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. Contrast Stelco Inc. v.
Canada (A.G.) (1987), [1988] 1 F.C. 510 (T.D.), where an earlier holding by the Supreme Court
of Canada on a fairness issue was regarded as virtually conclusive when the same point was
raised under section 7.
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a judicial solution that the administration regards as incomplete or
misguided. The courts may thus be presented with an opportunity
to reconsider the issue in the light of a statutory modification to the
impugned procedure, and any additional arguments about fairness
and efficacy. In contrast, to resort to the Charter for a solution at
the earliest opportunity is less likely to open a fruitful dialogue
between the different branches of government about a question of
administrative procedure than to bring it to an abrupt halt.
Thirdly, there is a particular reason for not attributing
directly to the Charter procedural standards applicable to federal
administrative agencies with power over the right to life, liberty and
security of the person. It has been assumed, although not
definitively settled, that a Charter challenge to federal administrative
action can always be made in the superior court of a province,
despite the wide and generally exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Federal Court in matters of federal administrative law.8 2 Whenever
possible, courts should avoid a solution to a problem that is likely to
fragment the Federal Court's jurisdiction. Opportunities for issue-
splitting, forum shopping, and multiple proceedings should not be
increased by setting aside a decision of, for example, a disciplinary
tribunal of a federal penitentiary, an immigration adjudicator, or the
National Parole Board, on the ground that it was not made in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, when the
same result could equally well have been reached through the
common law duty of fairness.
Nonetheless, there may be circumstances where the common
law does not adequately reflect those basic tenets of our legal
system captured by the principles of fundamental justice.
Occasionally a judge may have to reconsider, in the light of the
Charter, the validity of a common law rule established by a higher
82 Parliament cannot exclude the jurisdiction of section 96 courts to determine the
validity of federal legislation on division of powers grounds; hence, the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain proceedings against the federal Crown is to this
extent unconstitutional: A.G. Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
307. The question is whether this restriction is equally applicable to challenges to federal
statutes and administrative action on Charter grounds. See J.M. Evans & B. Slattery (1989)
68 Can. Bar Rev. 817 at 836-40. For a clear statement that the Law Society case does apply




court before the adoption of the Charter. An analogy is provided
by a criminal case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.8 3 In
this case, the accused argued that a recent, but pre-Charter, decision
of the Court should no longer be followed because it was
inconsistent with section 7. The earlier case8 4 had held that
drunkenness was normally irrelevant to the mens rea required for an
offence of general intention, and that evidence that the accused was
drunk when the actus reus was committed should accordingly be
withheld from the jury. In a substantively dissenting judgment, La
Forest J. agreed that the requirement of mens rea in "truly criminal
offences is ... so fundamental that it cannot, since the Charter, be
removed on the basis of judicially developed policy."85 However, he
also said:
Established common law rules should not, it is true, lightly be assumed to violate
the Charter. As a repository of our traditional values they may, in fact, assist in
defining its norms. But when a common law rule is found to infringe upon a right
or freedom guaranteed by the Charter, it must be justified in the same way as
legislative rules.
8 6
These observations are equally apposite to administrative law.
Courts should normally conclude that the content of the principles
of fundamental justice is to be found in the common law principles
of judicial review. However, they should also acknowledge that the
common law is not the only source of the "basic tenets" of our legal
system. Sometimes, the growth of the common law may have been
83 . v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 [hereinafter Bernard].
84 Leary v. R (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29, where the Court held that the accused's
drunkenness at the time of the actus reus is generally only relevant as a defence to crimes that
require a specific intent.
8 5 Berard, supra, note 83 at 891.
86 Ibid. at 891-92. In dissent, Dickson CJ. stated that the adoption of the Charter
enabled him to reconsider the correctness of Leary, which he would otherwise not have done,
even though he had dissented in that case. He held that the rule established in Leary
abrogated the requirement of mens rea, one of the basic tenets of our legal system, and thus
violated the principles of fundamental justice contrary to section 7 of the Charter.
The Chief Justice has also said that courts are not bound to interpret a word or
phrase in the Charter in the way that the same word or phrase has been interpreted in the Bill
of Rights. This is because of the constitutional status of the Charter see . v. lhyte, [1988]
2 S.C.R. 3 at 14-15.
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stunted by historical circumstances so that it no longer represents
contemporary notions of administrative justice, at least when the
interests protected by section 7 are in jeopardy. Other indications
that the common law no longer reflects widely accepted
contemporary notions of fundamental justice may be found in
legislation, reports of law reform bodies, academic commentary, and
other sections of the Charter.
8 7
Perhaps the most obvious example is the common law rule
that, with few exceptions and in the absence of a statutory
obligation, administrative tribunals are not legally required to give
reasons for their decisions or to make findings of fact.8 8 A number
of explanations may be offered for this rule. First, it was firmly
established before it became common for statutes to require the
giving of reasons, and before the courts "discovered" the duty of
fairness. The duty of fairness both expanded the scope of the
courts' supervision of agencies' procedures, and required them to
determine the adequacy of administrative procedures by an overt
balancing of interests. Secondly, the rule was settled well before
recent indications that decisions by judges at first instance may be
set aside on appeal because they do not include reasons. Thus, it
is no longer easy to justify the rule on the ground that
administrative tribunals should not be required to give reasons when
courts of law are not. Thirdly, to the extent that the rule is based
87 For instance, the section 11(b) guarantee of the right of a person charged with a
criminal offence to a trial "within a reasonable time" has been the basis of the view that it may
be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice to institute administrative proceedings
after an unreasonable delay: see, for example, Misra v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Saskatchewan (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (Sask. C.A.); Kodellas, supra, note 60.
Another section of the Charter may also tend to limit the content of the principles
of justice. In Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 16 there was majority support for the
proposition that ss 11(c) & 13 provide important, but not necessarily conclusive evidence of
the extent to which an accused person's right to remain silent forms part of the principles of
fundamental justice; however, section 7 performs the residual role of enabling courts to extend
the scope of the protection beyond the terms of the specific guarantees as circumstances
require. Compare H'bert, supra, note 79 where it was held that it is contrary to the principles
of fundamental justice for the police to override a suspect's refusal to provide a statement by
obtaining an admission through deception, even though the specific protections against self-
incrimination apply only to court proceedings, and the statement would have been admissible
under the common law rules applied in Canada to confessions.
88 For further detail, see J.M. Evans et al., Administrative Law: Cases, Tet and Materials,
3d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1989) at 309-26.
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on judicial procedure, it wrongly assumes that the courts of law
provide the sole procedural paradigm for administrative tribunals.
However, the tasks and structure of many tribunals are sufficiently
different from those of the courts. Thus, it may be perfectly
appropriate to require administrative tribunals to give and to publish
reasons for their decisions, regardless of the obligations of a judge
in a court of law.
89
In these circumstances it is appropriate to consider other
evidence of the basic tenets of our legal system9 ° For example,
Ontario's general statutory code of administrative procedure imposes
on many tribunals a duty to give reasons when requested.91 A
growing number of particular statutes in other jurisdictions do the
same. Law reform bodies have recommended a requirement of
reasons,92 and legal commentators have generally deplored the
shortcomings of the common law in this regard.93 The Supreme
89 For example, an administrative agency that normally delegates to panels the task of
hearing and deciding individual cases may still regard itself as generally responsible for the
quality of the decisions made by its members. A requirement of reasons may be vital to
quality control, and to members' education. Reasons may also inform unsuccessful applicants
for a licence, or some other benefit, what they must do to succeed in a future application.
90 Compare R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 62 (Ont. C.A.), where the
court indicated that the constitutional claim of an indigent accused to counsel is more
appropriately considered against the background of the modern evolution of the right to
counsel into "a social right or a human right" and of international guarantees of human rights,
than of the older common law.
Many of the procedural rights included in section 11 of the Charter that apply
directly only to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, may be applicable through section 7
to administrative proceedings. See, for example, M. Eberts, "Section 7 of the Charter Plus
Natural Justice: An Administrative Justice Section 11?" in Finkelstein & Rogers, supra, note
41, c. 7 at 101, for a discussion of cases where delay in instituting administrative proceedings
is alleged to violate the principles of fundamental justice.
91 Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 484, s. 17. The Supreme Court of
Canada has referred to the "principles and policies that have animated legislative and judicial
practice in the field" as evidence of the content of the principles of fundamental justice: see,
for example, R v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 at 327, and R v. Beare, supra, note 56 at 402.
92 See, for example, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Independent Administrative
Agencies (Working Paper 25) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1980) at 137-38.
93 For a slightly discordant note, see R.A. Macdonald & D. Lametti "Reasons for
Decision in Administrative Law" (1990) 3 Can. 3. Admin. L. & Prac. 123.
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Court of the United States includes the giving of reasons and
findings of fact within the Due Process requirement applicable to
tribunals that are constitutionally obliged to hold an evidentiary
hearing before deciding a dispute in which life, liberty and property
are at stake.94 Indeed, there are indications that Canadian courts
may use the Charter to supply this particular omission of the
common law.95 Moreover, one of the functions of a reasons
requirement is to ensure that the decision is responsive to the
evidence and argument presented at the hearing. Therefore, a duty
to give reasons, when requested, may be included within the concept
of a "fair hearing in accordance with the principles of justice" to
which section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights entitles a person
whose rights and obligations are being determined.
Nor would it be surprising if the courts held that the
principles of fundamental justice impose a positive obligation upon
a tribunal with power over the right to life, liberty and security of
the person to ensure that an individual is not deprived by poverty
of the assistance of counsel. A recently added section in the
Immigration Act96 confers on claimants to refugee status the right to
be provided with counsel before the screening panel. Both this
section, and general statutory schemes for legal aid, are evidence
that a right to legal representation, regardless of financial means, is
recognized as an essential attribute of justice when individual liberty
is at stake
9 7
See, for example, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
95 See Re D. & H. Holdings Ltd and City of Vancouver (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 230 at 237-
38 (B.C.S.C.); Wilson, supra, note 7; see also Re Khaliq-Kareemi, supra, note 8 at 504, where
it was said that, since the grounds of the decision were obvious, reasons were not required
by section 7 "in the circumstances." Contrast Osmond v. Public Service Board of New South
Wales (1986), 159 C.L.R. 656 (Aust. H.C.), where the court refused to find in either the duty
of fairness or statutory developments the bases for a common law requirement of reasons.
96 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 30(2) as am.; when read with the regulations, provided counsel
is only available to those who make their claim at the port of entry. The failure to extend
the right to inland claimants was attacked unsuccessfully as a denial of equality contrary to
section 15 of the Charter Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) v. Borowski (1990),
32 F.T.R. 205 (F.C.T.D.).
97 In a quite different context, intervenors in certain administrative proceedings in
Ontario now have a statutory right to receive funding before the hearing to pay for legal and
other expertise: Intervenor Funding Project Act 1988, S.O. 1988, c. 71.
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Perhaps the common law duty of fairness has never included
a positive right to be provided with counsel because the primary
function of the common law grounds of review has historically been
to limit the exercise of public power by imposing negative
obligations on government. However, it would surely be consistent
with the basic tenets of the modem legal system if courts today
required the state to ensure that no one is prevented by poverty
from exercising a right considered important to the protection of
fundamental individual freedoms. Judicial familiarity with the
administration of legal aid suggests that such a development would
not be beyond the traditional institutional competence of courts.
Additional support for this argument may be found in the Charter's
guarantee of equality, which the Supreme Court has said is
particularly aimed at protecting historically disadvantaged members
of society, including, presumably, the poor.98  There may even be
enough flexibility in the common law for a court to hold that, when
fundamental rights (such as those protected by section 7) are
threatened, fairness can require that the right to counsel includes
the right of an indigent person to be provided with a lawyer at
public expense.
It will only be necessary for a court to derive the right to
be provided with counsel directly from the Charter if existing
statutory legal aid schemes are regarded as exhaustive. The Ontario
Court of Appeal has held that the existence of legal aid schemes
makes it unnecessary to find that the Charter confers upon indigent
accused persons a general constitutional right to be provided with
counsel at trial.99 However, the court also said that a legal aid
administrator's decision to refuse legal aid because the accused has
the necessary financial means is subject to judicial review. It further
held that a fair trial in accordance with the principles of
9 8 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
99 R v. Rowbotham, supra, note 90. In R v. Robinson, supra, note 40 it was held that
the Charter gives no general right to be provided with counsel in criminal appeals, largely
because a right of appeal is not a basic tenet of the legal system: this is surely a questionable
proposition today, and in any event when a right of appeal is created by statute, the accused
is entitled to fairness.
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fundamental justice may only be possible if the court ensures that
the accused is legally represented.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to identify some issues that the
courts are likely to encounter as they give content, case by case, to
the principles of fundamental justice in administrative decision-
making. I have argued that, since the principles of fundamental
justice are a constitutional entrenchment of the basic tenets of our
legal system, they should normally be interpreted to correspond to
the common law grounds of review, especially the duty of fairness.
However, because of its constitutional status, section 7 allows
questions to be raised about the fairness of administrative
arrangements that, by virtue of statutory authorization, are beyond
the scope of common law scrutiny. In addition, the constitutional
significance afforded to the right to life, liberty and security of the
person may sometimes justify increasing the procedural protection
afforded to these interests. This should be accomplished, whenever
possible, through the common law, rather than the Charter
This paper has emphasized the influence of the common law
in shaping the content of the principles of fundamental justice. It
has argued that it is no longer a part of the basic tenets of our legal
system that administrative tribunals should aspire to a procedure that
is as close as possible to that of the courts of law. Nor should a
reviewing court invariably feel at liberty to determine the content of
the duty of fairness in a given situation without first carefully
considering the views of the agency that are likely to be informed
by the administrative experience of its members. However, if the
interests protected by section 7 are given a relatively narrow
interpretation, arguments for judicial restraint will be less compelling
than if the right to life, liberty and security of the person is held to
intrude significantly into areas of economic regulation, such as
professional discipline, licensing, land use planning, and labour
relations.
Nonetheless, the impact of the Charter on the relationship
between the courts and the administration is certain to be
considerable, even if the principles of fundamental justice prove to
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be the relatively modest addition to existing standards for
determining the legality of administrative action, or inaction, that has
been advocated here. Section 7 challenges have already required
the judiciary to widen its traditional field of vision beyond the
resolution of complaints by individuals claiming to be victims of a
particular administrative injustice. Instead, the courts have been
asked to scrutinize institutions, and the administrative arrangements
made by statute for the delivery of a government programme, in an
attempt to identify basic design flaws likely to produce injustice, or
features that have no rational relationship to implementing the
substantive aims of the scheme. As Singh and Morgentaler indicate,
the Supreme Court of Canada has not shrunk from employing the
principles of fundamental justice to force the legislature to make
radical reforms to the structure, and operating mandates, of public
institutions. It would challenge traditional understandings of courts'
institutional competence and legitimacy to include within the
principles of fundamental justice a general requirement that
administrative structures be designed and financed in a manner, and
to a level, that enables decisions to be made without undue delay.
If the common law should help inform the content of the
principles of fundamental justice, it is likely that the courts'
elaboration of this constitutional standard of review will in turn
shape the development of the common law grounds of judicial
review of public administration. Charter challenges may make
indisputably justiciable such issues as administrative inefficiency and
delay; the exercise of discretion to limit individual rights or to
impose sanctions disproportionate to the gravity of the apprehended
mischief;100 or the failure of an agency to establish and publish
policy guidelines, and a statement of goals and objectives. If the
line dividing legality from good administrative practice is shifted in
favour of legality under the influence of the Charter, it is unlikely to
be moved back when review is sought on non-constitutional grounds.
In addition, Charter litigation has increased courts' familiarity
with the language of rights, and prompted the development of a
100 See Slaight Communications, supra, note 6. In the context of criminal law, the
principles of fundamental justice have been held to include a requirement that the severity of
the stigma and the punishment "must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the
offender": Rv. Martineau (13 September 1990), No. 21122 (S.C.C.) at 8 per Lamer C.J.
1991]
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purposive approach to their delineation, and a structured
accommodation of competing interests.10 1 The modes of reasoning
and expression developed in Charter cases are likely to drive
reviewing courts to consider the constitutional fundamentals raised
by the law of judicial review of administrative action in cases where
the Charter is not directly relevant, and to frame their judgments
accordingly. The Charter has undermined the artificial barriers that
have for too long separated administrative and constitutional law,
and revealed the concerns and methodology that they share as
components of our public law.
101 These points are made very well by Colvin, supra, note 14.
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